Asked by joseph sciotto on Jun 12, 2024
Verified
Why does cooperative behavior break down in games with finite endpoints?
A) Each player has an incentive to deviate from a cooperative strategy during the last period.
B) A Nash equilibrium in pure strategies is not possible in finite repeated games.
C) Finite games have the same outcomes as one-period games, and cooperation is not possible in one-period games.
D) A Nash equilibrium is only possible in mixed strategies in finite repeated games, but all of the probabilities assigned to particular strategies approach zero as the number of finite game periods becomes large. Thus, we cannot evaluate the expected payoffs in these games.
Cooperative Behavior
Actions taken by individuals or groups that are intended to benefit others or achieve a common goal, often involving collaboration and mutual support.
Finite Endpoints
Refers to the established minimum and maximum boundaries or limits within which a particular operation, function, or variable exists.
- Identify the determinants of cooperative and noncooperative actions in successive games.
Verified Answer
MB
Melanie BarrettJun 19, 2024
Final Answer :
A
Explanation :
When a game has a finite endpoint, players have an incentive to deviate from cooperative strategies during the last period because there is no future to consider. This makes it more difficult to sustain cooperative behavior throughout the game.
Learning Objectives
- Identify the determinants of cooperative and noncooperative actions in successive games.